This week, Russia is hosting the third Russia-Africa summit in Moscow, as President Vladimir Putin aims to enhance Russia’s influence on the continent. The gathering, which includes African leaders, will focus on expanding economic, military, and political partnerships, though critics argue that these efforts primarily serve Moscow’s interests rather than those of ordinary Africans.
Putin is scheduled to cochair a plenary session on Thursday with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, who currently leads the African Union. Alongside the summit, a two-day economic and humanitarian forum will address key issues such as investment, food security, energy, technology, and payment systems. Organizers aim to promote “mutually beneficial cooperation” through trade and investment, with a new plan for 2027-2029 expected to be unveiled.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced that the summit could result in a significant number of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts. The previous forum in Sochi in 2019 resulted in 92 agreements, with Putin committing to double annual trade with Africa to $40 billion. However, this year’s summit in St. Petersburg culminated in 161 additional agreements and outlined a 2023-2026 action plan.
Despite these commitments, results have not met expectations. By the end of 2025, trade between Russia and Africa only reached $27.1 billion, significantly below the targeted $40 billion, with a persistent trade imbalance evident in 2026. During the first eight months of that year, Russia exported $14 billion to Africa compared to $3.2 billion in imports.
Russia’s agricultural exports contribute to this imbalance. In the first half of 2026, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to African nations, primarily benefiting Russian producers rather than fostering African industrial growth. For instance, while the El Dabaa project in Egypt has provided employment opportunities, it is financed largely through a substantial Russian loan that Egypt must repay.
Additionally, a notable gap exists between signed agreements and actual investments. At the 2019 summit, the construction of a $1.2 billion fertilizer complex in Angola was promised, but the project was abandoned the following year. In contrast, a petroleum pipeline project in the Republic of Congo would reportedly yield 90 percent of joint venture profits to Russian interests, with the Congolese state oil company receiving only 10 percent.
On the military front, as of October 8, Sweden’s Defence Research Agency noted at least 57 military agreements between Russia and 39 African countries. These agreements often focus on training and military infrastructure access. Russia’s military presence has included operations involving the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, which provide support to allied governments in conflict zones like Mali.
While Russian military support has helped regain territory for allied nations, it has not alleviated the violence civilians face. Recent data indicated that between April and August, Russian-backed operations in Mali resulted in civilian casualties, with evident human rights abuses reported.
Moreover, Russia is deepening its political influence through media partnerships. In July, the state broadcaster RT signed a content-sharing agreement with Tafouk TV, a new channel linked to the military governments in Mali and Niger. This partnership aims to promote military successes while suppressing dissenting views through censorship.
As Moscow’s presence grows, it fortifies relationships that favor Russian access to Africa’s mineral resources and supports authoritarian regimes, while ordinary Africans continue to deal with political repression and unmet developmental promises. Overshadowing the rhetoric of partnership, critics emphasize the importance of demanding accountability and equitable treatment from Moscow similar to what is expected from other global powers.
